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Introduction 
 Higher education’s financial crisis is being resolved largely through a politics of 
privatization, changing patterns of financing that increasingly shift responsibilities to individual 
students and their families. The politics of privatization makes it ever more difficult for low 
income students to attend college and has become a major financial burden for middle income 
people. Beyond cost shifting, privatization has increasingly subordinated the research and 
educational missions of higher education to imperatives of economic growth and 
competitiveness. Privatization has enhanced the entrepreneurial and corporate features of 
universities and colleges, changing the values of higher education away from notions of common 
property and the common good to individual self-interest and careerism. The autonomy of 
institutions of higher education has been weakened, and the economic status and professional 
independence of the faculty have been undermined. 
 In order to confront this epochal change and develop alternatives to it, we must analyze 
the changes in funding that have taken place and more fully articulate their consequences. In 
addition, we must analyze the political terrain and its possibilities. We must differentiate 
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between strategies of resistance and strategies of renewal. On the one hand, strategies of 
resistance aim at maintaining and enhancing funding in the milieu of legal and institutional 
frameworks that have been established through the Higher Education Act and other foundational 
statutes and policies. On the other hand, strategies of renewal aim more broadly at constructing 
an era of public policy that makes higher education more fully democratic, oriented toward 
common goals and the common good, and enhances the autonomy of higher education 
institutions and the faculty and professionals who serve them. 
Legislating Privatization 
 The privatization of higher education has been neither absolute nor drastic. Rather, it is 
being accomplished by degrees over time and in relative terms. Starting with the 1972 Education 
amendments, Congress began to shift the financing of higher education from a focus on direct 
institutional support to a market based approach that provided aid directly to students on the 
basis of need (Slaughter, 1998). Through the Pell grant program, Congress sought to emphasize 
student choice in a marketplace of higher education alternatives, allowing students to decide how 
federal support would be allocated to higher education institutions. With the adoption of the Pell 
Grant Program, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and other national 
policy institutions began to articulate a “high tuition-high aid” policy (Colwell, 1980; Leslie, 
1995) which aimed at expanding Pell Grants, increasing the amount of funding allocated to them, 
and enabling students to select private institutions. By the 1980s, Pell grants and other sources of 
student funding were stable while tuition was rising. Students were left to foot the bill either 
through their own resources, their families, or through borrowing. 
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 While privatization was being fostered through direct grants to students, statutes were 
enacted which made the research universities more entrepreneurial, corporate and profit oriented. 
The Bayh-Dole Act (1980) gave universities and businesses the right to retain ownership of 
inventions made with federal funds. This made faculty generated research a source of revenues 
for individual institutions rather than a common source of knowledge made available to the 
scholarly community (Rhoades & Slaughter, 1991). Legislation such as the Stevenson-Wydler 
Act (1980) enabled fuller cooperation between private businesses and universities in developing 
marketable products from intellectual property owned by universities through license or royalty 
agreements (Slaughter & Rhoades, 1996). The National Cooperative Research Act (1984) 
changed antitrust law so as to enable cooperative funding of research and development by 
government, industry and universities. Statutes like the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
(1988) sought to enhance intellectual property rights, including those held by universities and by 
consortia of universities, government and corporations. In this way, university based knowledge 
was increasingly being constructed through property rights and in terms of profit making and 
revenue enhancement rather than as a common good. Slaughter summarized this trend (1998): 
In the 1980s and 1990s, universities participated in privatization, deregulation, and 
commercialization to a degree greater than any public institutions other than the federal 
laboratories. Federal legislative changes overturned universities’ traditional position on 
intellectual property, in which intellectual property was the by-product of the quest for 
knowledge; instead it made knowledge, embodied in products and processes for global 
markets, the focus of science and technology. To a remarkable degree, the universities’ 
public interest mission was defined as best served by fostering the pursuit of private profit. 
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Shifting Costs to Students and Families 
  The privatization of higher education funding has been largely accomplished 
through increasing net tuition costs borne by students and their families. Net tuition is the cost of 
tuition after grants and subsidies provided by governments, nonprofit agencies, and institutions 
of higher education to their students. 
There has been a steady increase in net tuition as a percentage of total higher education 
revenues (State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEO), 2006). In 1981, net tuition was 
21.5 percent of total educational revenues. This increased to 31 percent in 1995 and then 
declined through the remainder of the 1990s, falling just below 30 percent in 2001. Since 2001, 
net tuition as percent of total higher education revenues has steadily increased to 36.7 percent in 
2005. Over this twenty-four year period, net tuition has increased by more than 15 percent as a 
percentage of total higher education revenues. 
 In addition, there has been continuing pressures on higher education financial resources. 
Between 2001 and 2005, enrollment at public institutions grew by 14.3 percent and inflation 
increased by 14.2 percent. The increases in state funding over this period did not meet the 
increased enrollment and inflationary increases. In concluding, the report states “the combined 
effects of enrollment growth and inflation grew faster than state and local support” (2006: 12). In 
constant 2005 dollars, the state and local support per full-time student was $5,833 in 2005 
compared to $7,121 in 2001. In effect, there was a decline of $1,288 per full-time student 
between 2001 and 2005. In the face of “projected increases in the college age population” and 
“the increasing economic importance of higher education,” the report states that the demand for 
higher education and the fiscal pressures will continue (2006: 12). Indeed, “if this trend 
4
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continues both the American tradition of affordable higher education and student participation 
could be threatened” (2006: 12). 
 The greater costs for higher education shifted to students and their families as a result of 
increases in net tuition are reflected in a decline in the “grant/loan ratio” presented by the 
College Board in Trends in Student Aid, 2008: 
For graduate students, loans constituted 65% of these funds and grants 32%. In contrast, 
for undergraduate students, loans are 49% and grants 45%. . . Loans have not replaced 
grants, but have grown more rapidly than grant aid in recent years, as college prices have 
risen, family incomes have stagnated, and grant aid has not grown rapidly enough to fill 
the growing gap (2008: 5).    
  The privatization of costs is not only the result of government funding not keeping up 
with the growth in student enrollment but, also, a result of changes in the composition of support 
to students and their families. For example, while federal support of higher education has been 
increasing, the composition of federal support has been moving toward loans and tax benefits 
rather than grants.  
College Board analysts state that the federal government provides 67 % of direct aid to 
students (2005). In 2003-2004, the federal government provided $81 billion which constituted a 
10 percent increase over 2002-2003 after accounting for inflation. The composition of federal 
aid, however, was largely in the form of student loans. For 2003-2004, 70 percent of the aid was 
in the form of loans, about 21 percent was in grants, and 8 percent was in the form of tax 
benefits. The increase in loans over grants was characteristic of sources of funding outside of 
direct federal support. Between 1996 and 2001, grant aid was growing more rapidly than loans. 
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This was also true from 1990 to 1993. From 2002 on, however, loans grew more than grants as a 
source of student financing for higher education. Indeed, between 1993-94 and 2003-04, the 
number of borrowers under Parent Loans for Undergraduates (PLUS) increased from 310,000 to 
735,000. The average loan under parents were assuming increased over this decade to $8,839, an 
increase of 54 percent in constant dollars (2005: 5).  
 By 2004, “combined, unsubsidized Stafford loans, federal loans to parents, and tax 
benefits” comprised 45 percent of total federal aid. These loan and tax benefit programs, 
moreover, were benefits that went to middle income and higher families. By comparison, Pell 
grants increased by 6 percent in 2003-2004. In 2003-2004, Pell Grants “funded 5.1 million 
students with average grants of $2,466” (2005: 4). As a result of an increase in the number of 
Pell Grant recipients over the previous year, the average grant actually fell by 1%. This decline 
in inflation adjusted value of Pell Grants was the first since 1999-2000. In addition, while the 
average Pell Grant covered 35% of charges at four-year public institutions in 1980-81, this 
declined to 23% of charges at four year public institutions in 2003-2004. By 2008-09, the 
amount of charges covered by Pell Grants recovered to 33% for public institutions (2009: 2). 5.4 
million students received Pell Grants in 2007-08, and increase of 5% over the prior year. 
 Not only have loans increasing at a much higher rate than grants, but for-profit lenders 
have become the largest source of higher education loans. In 2004-05, the fastest growing 
segment of student aid was private student loans (2006: 5). While half of student aid came in the 
form of both subsidized and unsubsidized loans from the federal government, the fastest growth 
was in PLUS loans which grew by more than $1 billion. Between 2003-04 and 2004-05, “the 
number of borrowers and the number of loans in PLUS programs grew more rapidly than the 
6
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number in either Stafford loan program. The unsubsidized Stafford Loan program grew more 
rapidly than the subsidized Stafford Loan Program” (2006: 5). Perhaps most disturbing, “as 
many as 25 percent of college students may be relying on credit card debt to help finance their 
education” (2006: 3). By 2004-05, the average debt for a student financing a bachelor’s degree at 
a public college or university was $15,500; 62 percent of students who received bachelor degrees 
at public institutions graduated with debt compared to 88 percent who graduated with a 
bachelor’s degree from a for-profit institution (2006: 12). Moreover, in constant the average Pell 
Grant declined by an additional 3 percent in 2004-05 in constant dollars. 
 This trend toward privatized financing has had dramatic effects on students according to 
a report by the Higher Education Research Institute at UCLA summarized in The Chronicle of 
Higher Education (February 4, 2005: 1). More than 47 percent of college freshman said that they 
would likely have to work during the academic year, this included a majority of men (53 percent) 
and about 40 percent of women (39.6 percent). The report explained these expectations on the 
basis on tighter state budgets and declining Pell Grants. Moreover, according to The Chronicle, 
“a number of studies have shown that working more than 20 hours a week increases the 
likelihood that a student will drop out of college” (February 4, 2005: A3). The College Board 
report, Trends in College Pricing (2006), states that “40 percent of all undergraduates and almost 
two-thirds” at two year institutions are attending part-time (2006: 2). 
While privatization affects student and family finances at all income levels, low income 
students are most impacted (Reed and Szymanski, 2004). According to a study by Eduardo J. 
Padron, President of Miami Dade College, “increasing college costs have a severe effect on low 
income students and families. Compared to the 47 percent increase in costs (between 1994 and 
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2004), personal incomes have risen only 10 percent. Published charges at public four-year 
colleges registered an astronomical 71 percent of a low income family’s earnings, compared to 5 
and 19 percent for upper-middle and middle income families respectively. Up to 25 percent of 
academically qualified low-income students no longer even apply to college” (2005: 3). As 
privatization becomes more dominant and as the financing of higher education falls more on 
students and their families, class privileges are enforced. 
The Perilous Growth of Student Debt 
 Due to cost shifting to students and their families, the increased debt incurred for higher 
education expenses has become unsustainable many students.  It poses a serious financial threat 
not only to them but, also, to institutions of higher education which depend on student 
borrowing. A financial structure has been established which requires students and their families 
to take on greater debt in the hope and expectation of increased future earnings. Higher education 
increasingly rests on this financial futures game and the increased borrowing by students and 
their families necessary to sustain it. 
A report prepared by State PIRGs (State Public Interest Groups) indicates student debt 
was becoming unsustainable in by 2000 (2002). Using the student loan industry’s standard that 
monthly payments of 8 percent of pretax monthly income as the threshold for manageable debt, 
by 2000 39 percent of student borrowers graduated with unmanageable levels of debt. By 1999-
2000, 64 percent of students graduated with student loan debt compared to 42 percent in 1992-
93. Over this period, the average debt had doubled from 1992-1993 from $9,188 to $16,928. 
While 5 percent of students owed more than $20,000 in 1992-1993, about 33 percent owed more 
than $20,000 in 1999-2000.  
8
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The burden of debt fell most severely on low-income students, and especially those low-
income students living independently. By 1999-2000, 71 percent of dependent student borrowers 
from families with less that $20,000 graduated with student debt compared to 44 percent of 
students from families with incomes greater than $100,000. 77 percent of low-income 
independent students with incomes less than $10,000 graduated with student loan debt compared 
to 57 percent of independent students with income greater than $50,000. The average debt for 
low-income independents was $20,447 compared to $17,583 for higher income independents. 
 Debt established by greater privatization was differentially distributed by ethnicity. By 
1999-2000, 84 percent of African American students graduated with student loan debt borrowing 
$2,000 on average more than the average borrower. Since they earned less than average after 
graduating, 55 percent of African American graduates who borrowed for their education had 
unmanageable debt. While Hispanic students graduated with lower than average student debt, 
they also tended to earn less so that 58 percent of them had unmanageable debt when they 
graduated. Because African American and Hispanic graduates typically come from lower-
income families and are more likely to go into debt for their educations, they are more likely to 
graduate with unmanageable debt. “Nearly half of all African-American college students and 
more than one-third of all Hispanic college students” graduated with unmanageable debt in 
1999-2000 (2002: 4). 
This description of student debt, moreover, does not take into account other debts 
accumulated by college students. For example, 41 percent of college seniors in 1999-2000 
carried credit card balances of $3,071. Student borrowers were somewhat more likely to carry 
credit card debt (48 percent) and to carry a higher balance ($3,176). 
9
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 The increase in debt is associated with, in the words of the National Center for Public 
Policy and Higher Education, “the deterioration of college affordability throughout the United 
States” (“Measuring Up: 2008,” 2009: 8). From 1982-1984 to 2006, college tuition and fees 
increased by 439 percent while median family income increased by 147 percent. As a result of 
the growing disparity between tuition and fees and family income, along with declining financial 
aid in the form of grants, net college costs as a percent of family income have increased for all 
income groups, but most especially for income groups at the lower end of the continuum. For 
public four-year colleges and universities between 1999-00 and 2007-08, net college costs 
increased from 39 percent to 55 percent of family income for the lowest income quintile, from 18 
percent to 25 percent for the middle income quintile, and from 7 percent to 9 percent for the 
highest income quintile. As income has stayed flat or declined for lower income and middle 
income families, and as net costs have increased, financing higher education through borrowing 
became increasingly prevalent. As the College Board shows in its analysis of student aid, the 
number of undergraduates borrowing through Federal Stafford loans has more than doubled and 
the amount borrowed in constant 2007 dollars has also more than doubled from $41 billion to 
$84 billion. 
Privatization: Donations, Endowments and Patents 
Privatization has impacts on institutions of higher education beyond their greater 
dependence on student debt. As greater responsibility for funding has shifted to colleges and 
universities, institutions have become more managerial in their efforts to raise private funds. The 
organization and culture of higher education institutions has been impacted by the need to raise 
greater amounts of money from private sources. 
10
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 At least through the early 2000s, colleges and universities have aggressively sought 
private donations. According to reports summarized in The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
private donations to colleges increased in the early 2000s (March 11, 2005: 1). In 2001, private 
contributions totaled $24.2 billion. This declined to $23.9 billion each of the years 2002 and 
2003. In 2004, private contributions increased to $24.4 billion, a 3.2 percent increase. Much of 
this funding, about 28 percent, came from alumni. About 25 percent was donated by foundations. 
The overall 3.2 percent increase was about the same as the level of inflation. In addition, 
individuals who were not alumni gave about 21 percent of the total contributions in 2004, an 
increase of over the 18 percent they gave in 2003. Corporate giving was 3.5 percent in 2004 
compared to 2.8 percent in 2003.  
One problematic change was 12.8 percent of alumni contributed, which was the third 
year of decline. While alumni contributions are increasing, the number of alumni contributing 
has been declining. Another concern was voiced by John Lippincott, president of the Council for 
Advancement and Support of Education. Lippincott stated, “I’m concerned that when we 
applaud the results, there is a tendency on the part of some that it means that the state or federal 
government can reduce their support” (March 11, 2005: A3). In other words, success in raising 
private funds may lead to a decline in public funding. Success in raising private funding serves 
as a rationale for reducing government funding and increases the pressure on colleges and 
universities to seek out more private funding. 
 In addition to the increase in private donations, returns on college endowments through 
the early 2000s were a stable source of funding. Endowments had “respectable” returns 
according to a report by The Chronicle of Higher Education (January 27, 2006: A1). While on 
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average, endowments had losses in 2001 and 2002, there was a gain of 3 percent in 2003. The 
average return on college endowments was about 15 percent in 2004 and about 9 percent in 
2005. There was considerable variation in rates of return in 2005 with the lowest at an 11 percent 
loss and the highest at a 22.3 percent gain (January 27, 2006: A30). Apparently Yale University, 
with the second largest endowment in the country, posted the highest gain at 22.3 percent.  
As a general rule, large endowments tended to have higher returns than small 
endowments due, in part, to wider resource allocation, greater risk taking, and use of the best 
management. Scott Malpass, vice president and chief investment officer at the University of 
Notre Dame, said of the 17.9 percent gain in Notre Dame’s $3.65 endowment, “Private equity, 
real estate, our private-energy portfolio investments in merging markets, venture capital, 
commodities – these are all things that did well for us” (January 27, 2006: A30). Only 9.6 
percent of endowment assets are managed internally. For the fifth year in a row, institutions are 
looking to outside professionals to manage their endowments. As Nancy Heller, senior managing 
director of TIAA-CREF Asset Management stated, “There has been a general trend toward 
outsourcing. Asset classes are more complex, and some institutions can only afford to have one 
person internally.” 
In addition to greater reliance on contributions and returns from endowments, institutions 
have sought to develop income sources from patents held in various combinations with private 
corporations and individual faculty members. Reporting on a survey conducted by the 
Association of University Technology Managers, The Chronicle of Higher Education states that 
“colleges and universities in the 2003 fiscal year filed more patents, identified a greater number 
of scientific discoveries, with commercial potential than ever, and signed a record number of 
12
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licenses with companies seeking to turn academic inventions into drugs, devices, and other 
products” (December 3, 2004: A27). In 2003, 165 institutions received almost $1 billion in 
licensing revenues. These included rights to use university owned inventions, settlements from 
patent infringement lawsuits, and “cashed-out equity in spin-off companies” (December 3, 2004: 
A27).  
About 25 percent of the licensing fees and spin-offs were concentrated in seven research 
universities. New York University, earning $86 million, ranked first income with a 37 percent 
increase over 2002. The largest source of this income was from a drug, Romicade, which treats 
rheumatoid arthritis and Chron’s disease. There are about 20 drugs on the market which use 
NYU-owned technology. According to Michael Douglas, associate vice chancellor and director 
of the Office of Technology Management at Washington University in St. Louis, being 
successful in this arena “all depends on bringing in a big deal” (December 3, 2004: A27). His 
university almost doubled its royalty earnings, from $6.5 million to $12.5 million by getting a 
big upfront payment from a German pharmaceutical company.  
Analyzing Sources of Privatization 
While it is beyond the scope of this article to attempt to fully explain the trend toward 
privatization in higher education, a broader analytic and historical context is necessary for 
developing alternatives to it. Three major economic forces establishing conditions for 
privatization: (1) A structural fiscal crisis at the level of state governments; (2) an ongoing fiscal 
crisis of the federal government that began in the 1970s and, with the exception of the late 1990s, 
has persisted with varying degrees of severity; and (3) A pattern of deepening household debt 
that increased in the early 2000s. 
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These forces, in turn, were given direction by conservative and neoliberal ideologies centering 
on individualism, careerism, and enhanced roles for markets across a wide array of social policy 
arenas, including higher education. 
 According to an American Association of University Professors (AAUP) report, 
unfunded mandates imposed on states by the federal government, sales taxes lost when 
customers shop tax free from Internet catalogues and web sites, and the loss of revenues from 
federal statutes that have made the Internet tax-free are major contribute to the fiscal crisis of 
state governments (2005). In addition, federal tax cuts enacted in 2001 negatively impacted state 
revenues for the many states that base their tax structure to the federal tax code. Citing a study by 
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the AAUP report shows that states lost $9 billion 
over the fiscal years 2002-05 due to changes in the federal tax code. In addition, states have been 
facing many pressures for spending on Medicaid, prisons, K through 12 education, and security 
after the 9/11 attacks. These structural changes have diminished sources of state revenues and 
established priorities that diminish higher education funding and have fueled the politics of 
privatization.  
 In addition to structural fiscal crises of state governments, there has been an ongoing 
fiscal crisis at the national level that emerged during the late 1960s. James O’Connor analyzed 
the structure and ideological dimensions of the fiscal crisis in his seminal work, The Fiscal Crisis 
of the State, published in 1973. 
Following O’Connor, the fiscal crisis of the state results from contradictions among the 
three major sectors of the political economy: (1) the monopoly sector which comprised capital 
and union intensive manufacturing including automobiles, aerospace and steel; (2) the state 
14
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sector which comprised federal research and development, governmental agencies dealing with 
health and welfare, and education; and (3) a competitive sector comprised of low capital and 
technology service, agricultural and light manufacturing combined with low levels of 
unionization. In O’Connor’s analysis, the needs of the corporate monopoly sector for research 
and development, capital investment in infrastructure, and a healthy and educated work force 
depend upon the activities of the state sector. Displaced and retiring workers in the monopoly 
sector also depend on the state sector for a measure of economic security. The competitive sector 
has members of the workforce who depend upon government to compensate them through 
unemployment insurance, welfare and other programs for the weaknesses and dislocations of the 
seasonal and competitive tasks they fulfill.  
These three sectors become contradictory with the stresses and, ultimately, the decline of 
tax revenues provided primarily by workers in the monopoly corporate sector. For O’Connor, the 
crisis of revenues is largely caused by the growing productivity of the monopoly sector and the 
declining demand for labor. To the degree that state sector workers are compensated in line with 
monopoly sector workers and to the degree that as monopoly sector workers move to the 
competitive sector their direct needs from government support increases, demands for 
government services tend to grow. These demands, moreover, grow in the face of a relative 
decline in revenues. As a result, there is a powerful structural gap between revenues and 
expenditures which takes the form of a fiscal crisis of the state. 
 This fiscal crisis proceeded with even greater ferocity than O’Connor anticipated during 
the late mid to late 1970s and 1980s (Bluestone and Bluestone, 1992). As a result of the 
petroleum crises of that period, rapid inflation due to both federal deficits and major increases in 
15
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the prices of basic commodities, and, perhaps most importantly, the collapse and 
“deindustrialization” of the monopoly sector of the economy due to foreign competition on 
domestic and international markets, the gap between the revenue base for government and the 
demands for government expenditures exploded. 
 There were, in O’Connor’s view, several alternatives for managing if not resolving, the 
fiscal crisis. One policy direction favored greater income equality among the different sectors of 
the economy. Greater equality would mitigate the economic distress of the competitive sector 
thereby reducing expenditures. In addition, greater rationalization of government programs and 
functions would lessen state expenditures: Streamlining of governmental agencies, combining 
federal and state activities, utilizing better management techniques, and other efforts to make 
government more efficient without diminishing its effectiveness.  
Another, and more fateful approach, looked toward reducing the expectations for 
government services, including higher education. This approach became dominant with the 
Reagan Administration’s formulation of “supply side economics.” It is predicated on the idea 
that lower marginal tax rates and taxes on capital would spur economic activity and, ultimately, 
tax revenues. Combined with a right wing social ideology of heightened individual 
responsibility, a restoration of family, traditional religious values, and limited government, the 
fiscal and ideological context for the politics of privatization in the arena of higher education 
financing was well established. 
 In their analysis of heightened fiscal crisis, Rubin, Orszag and Sinai provide a centrist 
analysis that stresses the contradictory features of privatization politics (2004). Their approach 
highlights the seriousness of the current crisis, lays considerable responsibility for it on the 
16
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policies of the Bush Administration, and call for both spending restraints and a roll back of tax 
cuts.  
Both ideologically and politically, privatization was bolstered by George W. Bush’s 
administration. A fiscal policy focusing on tax cuts favoring wealth and high income household 
has been put in place since 2001 (Rubin, Orszag and Sinai: 2004). The right wing political 
agenda aims to use limits on revenues as a way of undermining the federal government’s 
capacity to provide services, thereby “starving the beast.” This, however, has been contradicted 
by actual political forces. “Despite assertions to the contrary, granting large tax cuts to some 
groups may thus make it less politically feasible to rein in the desires of other constituencies to 
obtain increases in spending programs” (Rubin, Orszag and Sinai, 2004: 15). The right wing 
view that “engineering a fiscal crisis” would serve as a means to control and, ultimately, sharply 
curtail spending on entitlement and discretionary programs has very limited plausibility and 
success. Such a “self imposed” crisis is more likely to lead to a political impasse in which 
deficits grow. 
 The ongoing fiscal crisis of states and the national government shaping privatization of 
higher education are the result of contradictory economic and political forces. In recent years, 
these crises have been heightened by increasing personal debt, not only for higher education, but 
more generally in relation to income and assets. From 1997 to 2007, personal sector debt 
increased by 159.1 percent (Turner, 2008: 26-27). Over this period, the debt to disposable 
income ratio grew from 93.4 percent to 139 percent, its highest level since the end of World War 
II. Over the same period, house prices more than doubled. While people were increasing their 
debt relative to their income, their higher debt was more than compensated for by the growth in 
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the value of the equity in their homes. This has all come crashing down with the bursting of the 
housing bubble and the decline of the stock market. Housing prices declined, on average, by 18 
percent in 2007 and 25 percent in 2008. The Federal Reserve has reported that household net 
worth declined by 18 percent in 2008, falling by more than $ 11 trillion (2009). In the fourth 
quarter of 2008, household net worth dropped by $5.1 trillion, which would constitute a 31 
percent annualized decline. Since its peak in 2007, household net worth has declined 20 percent. 
Alternative Policy Directions in Higher Education 
 Financial crises and the politics of privatization have provided the grounds for much of 
contemporary policy debate around higher education funding and ideologies. There are three 
broad approaches that are responsive to both fiscal issues of higher education: (1) a view that 
cutting government support would actually be beneficial; (2) a view toward balancing public and 
private spending; (3) a view toward maximizing government support by providing for free higher 
education. 
 The position that cutting governmental higher education spending would actually be 
beneficial is represented by the CATO Institute. Gary Wolfram, George Munson Professor of 
Political Science, argues in Policy Analysis that “Congress should consider a phase-out of higher 
education over a 12-year period” (2005: 1). Wolfram maintains that such a phase-out would have 
a number of salutary effects. First, the withdrawal of federal funding would strengthen the 
independence of higher education institutions. Their autonomy would be increased with less 
dependence on federal monies and on federal regulations. Second, a decline in federal funding 
would lead to a reduction in tuition prices. Since the federal government is a third party payer for 
higher education, its expenditures serve to increase demand for college attendance and, thereby, 
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spur increases in tuition. Third, the “private market” would respond to a federal government 
phase-out by increasing private sector loans, providing additional private scholarships, and 
expanding “human capital contracts” which “would allow students to pledge a portion of future 
earnings in return for assistance in paying their tuition.” In effect, cutting government subsidies 
to higher education would reduce taxes and expenditures, reduce the costs of higher education, 
and enhance private action and responsibilities. 
 Establishing a new balance between public and private spending is a position exemplified 
by the International Monetary Fund. In a report prepared by Nicholas Barr which generalizes 
from experiences in the United Kingdom, two key “economic” principles are given as this basis 
for a new balance: (1) central planning is no longer feasible or desirable; (2) students should 
contribute to the cost of their degree. Barr argues that since both society and the individual 
benefit from higher education, both public and private benefits should be recognized. The public 
benefits are an outcome that merits public financing, especially for those students who cannot 
afford to pay. The private benefits are an outcome that accrues to the individual for which the 
individual should pay. In order to fulfill the public role, access to higher education should be 
realized through scholarships and grants to “students from poor backgrounds” (2005: 6). In 
addition, there should be support for students with low earnings after graduation. Beyond 
scholarships and grants based on need, students should finance their higher educations through a 
mixture of public and private sector loans which aim at an interest rate “broadly equal to the 
government’s cost of borrowing” (2005: 3). This approach recognizes the social and individual 
benefits of higher education and seeks to balance them financially through the provision of 
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government funds enabling access and through subsidies to control interest rates. In effect, this a 
centrist position that accords with the Rubin, et al., position on fiscal crisis policies. 
 The third position, formulated by Reed and Szymanski (2004), calls for free public higher 
education. While grounded in the crisis of access and affordability that is being exacerbated by 
the politics of privatization, this approach begins with the “assumption” that public higher 
education is a “right” for “all applicants who meet admissions standards regardless of their 
ability to pay” (2004: 39-40). Claiming that such a program would cost an additional $60 billion 
beyond current government expenditures, the authors argue that it could be easily paid for by 
“closing some corporate tax loopholes, eliminating some tax cuts for the very wealthy, or taking 
a slice from the $400 billion defense budget” (2004: 43). The proposal, modeled on the GI Bill 
or Rights, is self-consciously rooted in a populist politics of opportunity, greater equality, and 
collective identity. While more out of the current ideological mainstream than either of the other 
two approaches, it makes access to higher education a political goal that is within reach and 
which “can be won in the foreseeable future” (2004: 43). 
A Politics of Resistance 
 In a fiscal and political climate dominated by a politics of privatization, much of the 
higher education community has been engaged in preventing further erosion of funding and 
demanding restoration of prior levels of funding. While the Collective Bargaining Congress of 
the AAUP, several AFL-CIO state organizations, and other union and educational groups have 
endorsed the proposal for free public higher education, their practical efforts have been bounded 
by current legislative initiatives and debates. In this light, much of the AAUP’s focus is “on full 
funding for student aid, institutional aid, academic research, professional development and other 
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programs that strengthen the quality of higher education and promote broad access to our 
nation’s colleges and universities” (AAUP Position Paper, 2005). The focus is on exerting 
influence on House and Senate subcommittee’s that provide funding for existing programs. With 
regard to student aid, the AAUP, for example, calls for an increase for the Pell Grant to $4,500, 
and to “ensure that all students receive the maximum grant they are entitled to.” The AAUP calls 
for increased research funding for the sciences through NIH, NSF and EPA programs as well as 
“level” funding for the humanities through the National Endowment for Humanities. The AAUP 
has memberships in the Student Aid Alliance and the National Humanities Alliance in the effort 
to build coalitions around student funding and research funding. 
 Other efforts have apparently generated splits among higher education advocates (Inside 
Higher Education, March 27, 2006). The National Association of Independent Colleges and 
Universities has been strongly opposed to legislation approved by the House Education and 
Workforce Committee favoring for-profit institutions. They have sought to defend funding 
sources for traditional institutions by limiting the eligibility of for-profit institutions for student 
financial aid. They have opposed the weakening of eligibility that required colleges to generate 
at least 10 percent of their revenues from sources other than federal financial aid programs and 
have opposed the creation of a “single definition” of a higher education institution that would 
enable for-profit institutions to be eligible for a variety of federal grants.  Other groups, such as 
the American Council on Education, have not been as sharp in their criticism. They have sought 
to work with the Congressional leadership in an effort to soften the positions and work out a 
compromise for reauthorizing the Higher Education Act. 
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 Even defensive positions of strong opposition and “working with the leadership” are 
obfuscated by abstracted, systems based rhetoric in formulating directions for higher education. 
This is captured in the tone of a report by The Commission on Public University Renewal 
(2005). The commission, established by the American Association of State Colleges and 
Universities, extols the role of public higher education “as one of the true success stories in our 
nation’s history” that has served “students, main streets, communities, and states from the 
Industrial Age to the Space Age and now to the Information Age”(2005: 1). Recognizing the 
pressures on state treasuries, the report places special emphasis on Medicaid and an aging 
population, “The share of the states’ general fund budgets dedicated to Medicaid has doubled 
over the past two decades, and now exceeds that of higher education. The share of the population 
65 and older – which tends to rely more on public services – is projected to jump from 12 
percent in 2000 to 20 percent in 2030” (2005: 5).  
In the face of these pressures, the report calls for “a long term vision” and for “campuses 
and systems” to work “collaboratively to renew and update basic commitments, specifically, 
broad access to quality opportunity and partnerships for the public good” (2005: 6). In realizing 
these commitments, the report calls for public higher education and government to “be prepared 
to give a little” (2005: 28). While government should give up efforts to “micromanage,” 
“colleges and universities have to focus more on demonstrating outcomes and return on 
investment” (2005: 28). In demonstrating outcomes, there should be a focus “on products rather 
than the means of production” and “greater public entrepreneurship” that enhances “flexibility, 
agility, creativity and calculated risk taking” (2005: 28). In making these directions operational, 
the report calls on presidents and chancellors to “create incentives for entrepreneurial behavior 
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and efficiency” and for both policy makers and administrators to “more comprehensively 
account for student progress” through “accountability systems” that enable better measurement 
of “institutional outcomes” (2005: 31). 
Directions for Renewal 
 The examples of resistance given above are sobering. They reflect that, indeed, the 
“higher education policy arena of the last century has fragmented into multiple arenas” that 
reflect a wide range of interests and constituencies (Parsons, 2005: B20). The policy arena of the 
past, featuring a bipartisan approach to higher education, no longer exists. With a “general shift 
toward viewing college as a private benefit instead of a common good,” traditional advocates for 
higher education are on the “outside” and, according to Parsons, must seek to build coalitions 
around specific issues and view themselves as “just another special interest” (2005: B20). 
 To be sure, advocates for higher education must attend to the details of specific 
legislation and administrative rules, keep communications open with members of Congress and 
their staffs, and make every effort to inform the wider public of the inequities in higher education 
funding and the particular burdens placed on students and families, especially those with low 
incomes. The AAUP Task Force on State Budget supports these approaches (2005). The Task 
Force urged states to “update their revenue systems to reflect structural changes in the economy” 
and to “encourage faculty to work within institutional governance structures to ensure that 
colleges and universities deliver quality programs at top efficiency” (2005). We must be 
continually engaged in current political realities. In the everyday efforts of higher education 
policy formation, we should address issues at the limits of what is practical. 
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 Yet, especially for faculty activists in the union movement, the constraints of the present 
must be confronted through greater efforts at organization, education, and imagination. Faculty 
unionists do not report to the chancellor, the provost, or the board of trustees, but, rather to their 
colleagues and to other stakeholders in higher education: employees, students and their families. 
If the politics of privatization defines this epoch, a new epoch must be built from within it. Such 
an epoch would, to be sure, place high value on scientific knowledge and expertise. But it would 
do so in a way that viewed such knowledge as the common moral property of humanity. Such an 
epoch would value creativity, diversity and equality in the access to higher education not only as 
a career path for individuals, but as a way of building community, collective identities, and 
shared culture. Such an epoch would enable faculty and professionals in higher education to 
address such key issues as national health care, ecological renewal, economic justice, and a 
society built on renewable energy in ways that directly relate to the interests and values of broad 
citizenry. As part of the broader social fabric, faculty and professionals in higher education 
institutions are positioned to articulate and help build a better future. 
 Building popular coalitions within the labor movement, among alumni, students and 
broader communities around shared values is crucial if we are to break the current fetters on 
higher education. Such coalitions must be built by attending to the deeper sources of the financial 
crisis of higher education. Challenging the politics of privatization and providing an alternative 
to it requires bringing together expertise in a variety of areas that directly impact higher 
education costs in an agenda that would resolve broader problems in the political economy, 
renew sources of funding for the public good, and provide directions for social renewal. 
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 Higher education advocates, and unionists in particular, should focus on immediate 
financial issues in legislative and regulatory arenas. Yet there must also be space and resources 
devoted to broadening coalitions and providing a vision of the structure and mission of higher 
education in a more democratic and humane epoch. For educators, professionals and scholars 
committed to the common good, this is an obligation and a source of public happiness.  
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